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SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DISABILITY 
DISCREPANCIES: THE DEBATE BETWEEN STREET-LEVEL 




In practice, attorneys know that it is hard to get awards at the initial 
stages of the Social Security application process, but the chances of 
receiving benefits increase once the applicant gets a hearing in front of an 
administrative law judge.  This is common practice and typically how the 
system works, but should it be how the system works?  The Social Security 
Administration’s administration of benefits differs both vertically within the 
disability adjudicative system and horizontally in different regions, states, 
and judicial districts.  This article explores a study of how role discretion, 
based on hierarchical position in the Social Security Administration’s 
application and appeals process, affects the overall success of applicants. 
More specifically, the study concentrates on a state’s political control, 
workloads, and a state’s financial contributions to the benefit award 
program and the effects of these factors on the percent of awards 
administrative law judges are responsible for granting. 
After running an Ordinary Least Squares regression, the study found 
that overall state political controls, workload demands, and a state’s 
financial contribution to the benefit awards program have an effect on the 
percent of awards administrative law judges are responsible for granting. 
Particularly, the study found that the initial workload of street-level 
bureaucrats has a negative relationship with the percent of awards 
administrative law judges are responsible for granting.  Furthermore, the 
study found that the workload of administrative law judges has a positive 
relationship with the percent of awards administrative law judges are 
responsible for granting.  This study therefore suggests that workload may 
be contributing to the discrepancies in the Social Security Administration’s 
disability awards process. 
 
* Erica M. Woehl graduated from the University of North Dakota with a Juris Doctorate 
and a Master of Public Administration in 2014.  The underlying research in this article was 
conducted for her final independent study before receiving her Master’s degree.  Erica gives the 
most immediate thanks to the Honorable Alvin O. Boucher for the inspiration and to Dr. Andy 
Hultquist for his guidance and assistance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ask a social security disability attorney what an applicant’s chances are 
for receiving benefits and he will tell you, “We just have to keep appealing 
and request a hearing.”  In practice, attorneys know that it is hard to get 
awards at the initial stages of the application process, but the chances of 
receiving benefits increase once the applicant gets a hearing in front of an 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”).  This is common practice and typically 
how the system works, but should it be how the system works?  Is this 
discrepancy a strategy by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) to 
award less benefits or is something within the administrative process 
broken? 
The Social Security Disability application and appeals process can be 
broken down into five stages.1  The first two stages, the initial 
determination and the reconsideration, are handled by bureaucratic level 
decision makers.2  The initial determination and the reconsideration both 
follow a rigid template of questions in order to make the decision.3  The 
third stage, an administrative hearing conducted by an ALJ, allows for a bit 
 
1. Hugo Benítez-Silva, Mosche Buchinsky & John Rust, How Large Are the Classification 
Errors in the Social Security Disability Award Process? 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. W10219, Jan. 2004), http://www nber.org/papers/w10219. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 7-8. 
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more flexibility and discretion.4  The applicant then has the chance to 
appeal first to a review council and lastly to the federal courts.5 
The Social Security Administration is inconsistent in its application of 
the law, both vertically within the disability adjudicative system and 
horizontally in different regions and judicial districts.6  If decisions can vary 
so greatly from the initial determinations to the appeals level, and 
differently from state to state, what does that say about the discretionary 
roles of the employees?  In order to answer some of these questions, this 
study explores how role discretion, based on hierarchical position in the 
Social Security Administration’s application and appeals process, affects 
the overall success of applicants. 
Research in this area has noted the disparity in the decisions among 
differing states and between different adjudicating levels;7 however, no 
research has pointed to why such disparities exist.  These disparities raise 
an alarming question: Why is there such a discrepancy among the initial 
stages of determination and the determinations by an ALJ?  In an attempt to 
answer this question, data was compiled from the Social Security 
Administration and organized by state in order to determine the percentage 
of the overall appeals rate in each state.8  The unit of analysis is each state.  
The study considered the roles state political control, state Social Security 
funding and administration, and caseload demands have on applicant appeal 
success rates. 
If the reasons for these disparities are noted, then they can be fixed in 
order to better apply the laws more consistently.  Furthermore, if the initial 
determination or subsequent reconsideration is handled properly, then it 
saves the Social Security Administration time and money.  Implementing 
new policies nationwide would solidify a standard by which benefits can be 
distributed equally among states.  In order to better understand the 
significance of answering these questions, this article will briefly discuss 
the structure of the Social Security Disability’s application and appeal 
process in Part II.  Part III will then discuss the previous research in this 
area.  Finally, Parts IV and V will outline the methodology, findings, 
analysis, and conclusion. 
 
4. See id. at 9. 
5. Id. 
6. Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social 
Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, 760 (2003). 
7. See discussion infra Part III. 
8. See infra Table A1.  
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II. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
The Social Security Act was amended in 1956 to provide cash benefits 
to former workers who could demonstrate their inability to continue gainful 
employment.9  This amendment created two new programs: the Social 
Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) program and the Supplemental 
Security Income (“SSI”).10  To qualify for SSDI, recipients must have paid 
into Social Security a minimum amount determined by their age and 
employment history, and for SSI, recipients must meet a means test.11  Both 
programs are federally funded, and the federal government determines the 
rules for eligibility of the benefits.12 
After applying for benefits, a person’s application is sent to one of the 
fifty-four Disability Determination Services (“DDS”) centers.13  After filing 
an application, applicants will receive an initial determination.14  If the 
applicant receives an unfavorable decision, he can make a request for 
reconsideration.15  Initial determinations and requests for reconsideration 
determinations are both made by the same DDS, which are state-level 
bureaucracies.16 
These first two stages use a five-step determination process to test if 
applicants qualify for benefits.17  The first step is to determine whether or 
not the person has engaged in substantial gainful activity subsequent to the 
claimed onset of the disability.18  If not, the street-level bureaucrat explores 
whether or not the applicant is severely impaired.19  If the applicant is 
severely impaired, the third step consists of a determination of whether the 
applicant’s impairment meets the criteria of 1 of over 100 standardized 
impairments.20  The last two steps ask if the applicant has a capacity to do 
 
9. Lael R. Keiser, State Bureaucratic Discretion and the Administration of Social Welfare 
Programs: The Case of Social Security Disability, 9 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 87, 90 
(1999). 
10. Id. 
11. Lael R. Keiser, Understanding Street-level Bureaucrats’ Decision Making: Determining 
Eligibility in the Social Security Disability Program, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 247, 248 (2010).  
12. RALPH DOLGOFF, DONALD FELDSTEIN & LOUISE SKOLNIK, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL 
WELFARE: A SEARCH FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 202-203 (Linda W. Witzling & Susan L Alkana eds., 
3d ed. 1993). 
13. Hugo Benı́tez-Silva, Moshe Buchinsky, Hiu Man Chan, John Rust & Sofia Sheidvasser, 
An Empirical Analysis of the Social Security Disability Application, Appeal, and Award Process, 
6 LABOUR ECON.147, 148 (1999).  
14. 20 C.F.R. § 422.140. 
15. Id. 
16. Benítez-Silva et al., supra note 1, at 2. 
17. Id. at 7-8. 
18. Id. at 8. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
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his prior work or if he has the capacity to do any other work.21  If the 
determination is made that the applicant has the capacity to do his prior 
work or some other work, he will be denied benefits.22 
After a denial at the reconsideration stage, the applicant may request a 
hearing.23  An ALJ will either allow the hearing and make a determination 
on the matter or deny the request for a hearing.24  The ALJ will base his 
“decision on the preponderance of the evidence offered at the hearing or 
otherwise included in the record.”25  Applicants, as a “party to a hearing 
decision or dismissal, may request a review of such action by the Appeals 
Council.”26  The Appeals Council will either deny the request for review, 
remand the case back to the ALJ, or make a determination itself.27  Lastly, 
the applicant may file a lawsuit against the Social Security Administration, 
or its state counterpart, in federal court.28 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior research in this area has noted a trend of inconsistencies both 
vertically and horizontally within the SSA disability system. Benítez-Silva, 
Buchinsky, and Rust found that only 38% of applicants are accepted at the 
initial determination.29  They also found that only half of the applicants that 
were denied at the initial stage request a reconsideration, and only 16% are 
awarded benefits at the reconsideration stage.30  Of the applicants that 
appeal to an ALJ, approximately 59% are awarded benefits.31  Benítez-
Silva, Buchinsky, Chan, Rust, and Sheidvasser found that the appeals 
process “increases [an applicant’s] award probability from 46% to 73%.”32 
These percentages are based upon federal application numbers and 
responses from a Health and Retirement Survey, a national longitudinal 
survey.33  This research not only demonstrates the disparity among the SSA 
vertically, but it also shows the importance of the appeal itself. 
 
21. Id. at 8-9. 
22. Id.   
23. 40 C.F.R. § 422.203. 
24. Id. § 422.203(c). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. § 422.205. 
27. See Lael R. Keiser, Street-level Bureaucrats, Administrative Power and the Manipulation 
of Federal Social Security Disability Programs, 1 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 144, 160 n.1 (2001). 
28. See id. 
29. Benı́tez-Silva, et. al, supra note 1, at 9.  
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Benı́tez-Silva et al., supra note 13, at 147. 
33. Id. at 153. 
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The SSA functions through many state bureaucracies.34  Other research 
in this area has focused on the disparities among the award processes in the 
SSA horizontally, focusing specifically on states and regions. Lael R. 
Keiser found that variation exists among initial determinations made by 
different states.35  The amount of discretion variation differs among street-
level bureaucrats and ALJs.36  These variations indicate that the 
implementation of the federal rules and the award process are not uniform. 
However, as Max Weber, a German philosopher, sociologist, and political 
economist,37 explained, it is a “basic principle of bureaucratic administra-
tion . . . that implementation should be uniform.”38  It is clear that the SSA 
is inconsistent in its application of the law, both vertically within the 
disability awards system and horizontally in different regions and judicial 
districts.39  These disparities have been prevalent for years, but the reason 
for such variations has not yet been pinpointed. 
A. CONCENTRATION ON STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS 
After noting these disparities, researchers have concentrated on the 
implementation process at the street-level.  In the SSA, initial disability 
determinations are made by street-level bureaucrats known as DDS 
workers.40  Michael Lipsky defined street-level bureaucrats as “public 
service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their 
jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work.”41  
DDS decisions “also vary widely across states at a given point in time, 
again in a manner that is difficult to ascribe entirely to differences in the 
characteristic of the applicant pool.”42  Keiser explains that while the DDS 
application stages have a strict set of eligibility requirements, “state 
examiners retain considerable discretion because of the nature of [the SSA] 
 
34. See Benı́tez-Silva et. al, supra note 1, at 2. 
35. Keiser, supra note 27, at 149. 
36. See id. at 148.  
37. Max Weber, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/weber/.  
38. Helena O Stensöta, Political Influence on Street-level Bureaucratic Outcome: Testing the 
Interaction Between Bureaucratic Ideology and Local Community Political Orientation, 22 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 553, 553 (2012) (citing MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (Talcott parsons, ed. and trans., A.M. Henderson, trans., N.Y. Free 
Press 1964) (1947). 
39. Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 6, at 760. 
40. Keiser, supra note 27, at 148. 
41. Michael Lipsky, Street-level Bureaucracy: The Critical Role of Street-level Bureaucrats, 
in CLASSICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 412, 419 (Jay M. Shafritz & Albert C. Hyde eds., 
2012). 
42. Benítez-Silva et al., supra note 1, at 2. 
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programs.”43  “The federal government has tried to control the decisions of 
disability examiners by creating binding rules, but this has been difficult 
because these bureaucrats work for the states” and retain a significant 
amount of discretion.44  Therefore, because the street-level bureaucrats have 
the power to determine for which of the many programs a claimant is 
eligible, the “elected officials have an incentive to manipulate eligibility so 
that as many claimants as possible qualify” for the state’s least expensive 
program.45 
Keiser’s 1999 study of the Social Security Administration’s DDS 
workers explored “the impact of state level environmental characteristics on 
the use of discretion.”46  Overall, Keiser concluded that “professional norms 
play a large role in directing the ways that street-level bureaucrats use their 
discretion” and “[w]hile the bureaucracy is professional, it is also 
responsive to local political concerns.”47  In short, Keiser concluded that 
“disability rates at the state level are a function of the economic 
environment (unemployment rate), the task environment (aged population 
and percent of employees working in manufacturing), and the political 
environment (Democratic control of state legislatures).”48  Therefore, “it is 
possible that street-level bureaucrats at the state level try to use the program 
strategically but that their efforts are thwarted during the federal appeals 
process.”49  This is especially true given the relatively high reversal rates by 
ALJs.50 
Keiser’s subsequent 2001 study further suggests that “given the 
discretionary nature of the disability decisions, it is not surprising that 
variation exists . . . among the states and within the same state from year to 
year.”51  Keiser found that “street-level bureaucrats respond to the fiscal 
incentives that exist for state government to manipulate access to these 
programs.”52  Overall, her findings suggest “that when state governments 
have a financial interest in whether applicants are given access to a 
program, street-level state bureaucrats take these interests into account in 
 
43. Keiser, supra note 27, at 148. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Keiser, supra note 9, at 87. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 100.  It is important to note that Keiser’s statistics included the decisions from 
ALJs, the Appeals Council, the federal district court, as well as the DDS worker’s decisions.  Id. 
at 102. 
49. Id. 
50. Benítez-Silva et al., supra note 13, at 152. 
51. Keiser, supra note 27, at 149. 
52. Id. at 158. 
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their decision making.”53  More specifically, Keiser found that “the 
governor’s party does not influence award rates” because the “programs 
associated with Social Security tend to be supported by both parties more 
than other anti-poverty programs.”54  Keiser also found that caseload 
demand affects the award rate because “high demand reduces acceptance 
rates due to resource shortages.”55 
Keiser’s most recent study, produced in 2010, begins to delve into the 
relationship between the vertical hierarchical actors within the SSA.56  In 
seeking to understand the effect of face-to-face interactions on the award 
rate, Keiser also studied “the impact of street-level bureaucrats’ individual 
characteristics, such as their ideology, adherence to agency goals, attitude 
towards clients, information about other bureau actors, and decision-making 
speed, on how generously [DDS workers] apply eligibility rules.”57  Most 
significantly, Keiser noted, “Examiners with knowledge of how many cases 
administrative law judges overturn report about [six] percent higher 
allowance rates than those without this knowledge.”58  This indicates that 
simple information sharing about the ALJ reversal rate would enhance 
consistency among agencies.59 
B. CONCENTRATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 
Other research has concentrated on or even blamed ALJs for these 
discrepancies.  For example, Richard Pierce argues that ALJs should be 
eliminated because of the disparity among the initial determinations and the 
ALJs’ reversal ratings.60  Pierce suggests that greater accuracy and 
consistency would be achieved by relegating virtually all decision making 
to state agency DDS’s paper review process.61  However, as already noted, 
“[t]here are dramatic and unexplained variations among the state agencies 
 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 157. 
55. Id. 
56. Keiser, supra note 11, at 247. 
57. Id. at 248-54.  
58. Id. at 253.  
59. Id.  Of note, here, Keiser begins to look at the interaction between ALJ and DDS 
workers.  However, overall Keiser’s study concentrates on how frontline workers implement 
policy when they lack face-to-face contact with the applicants, and it spends very little time 
delving into the relationship between ALJs and DDS workers. 
60. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Should We Do About Social Security Disability Appeals? 
Administrative Law Judges, Overruling SSA Rejections of Disability Claims, Contribute Heavily 
to Federal Spending, 34 REGULATION 34, 34, 39-40 (2011).  
61. Id. 
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that handle initial and reconsideration decisions.”62  For example, “in 2010, 
the DDS for Mississippi granted initial claims in 24.9% of cases,” 
compared to New Hampshire’s DDS who granted initial claims in 49.5% of 
the cases.63  Others believe that the switch to an all street-level review 
process would not increase accuracy and consistency because “[s]tate 
agency adjudicators handling the initial and reconsideration disability 
determinations have considerably less training, education, and relevant 
experience for the task than federal ALJs.”64 
Even though judges and street-level bureaucrats often compose the 
same welfare system, they have very different roles.65  A Social Security 
ALJ must function within the framework of the SSA by following 
regulations, appropriate precedents, and agencies policies.  However, 
“[d]ecisions rendered by the administrative law judges are governed in large 
part by professional integrity, competency, and a sense of responsibility.”66  
Hayes explains that an ALJ’s position is unique because “he has a dual 
responsibility to safeguard the interests of both the claimant and the Federal 
Government.”67  “This means that [the ALJ] is duty bound to see that 
benefits are paid only to claimants who meet the requirements set out in the 
law.”68 
In contrast to much of Keiser’s work on street-level bureaucrats, Vicki 
Lens seeks to understand the ways in which ALJs exercise discretion and 
how it affects the adjudication of disputes between Social Security frontline 
workers and applicants.69  Lens compares frontline workers and ALJs.70 
She explains that frontline decision makers exercise very little discretion 
because they focus “on processing information accurately, efficiently, and 
consistently.”71  In contrast, ALJs “have the autonomy, professional know-
ledge, and skills to make individualized and complex determinations.”72 
ALJs are unique because not only are they judges, they are also 
 
62. Jon C. Dubin & Robert E. Rains, Scapegoating Social Security Disability Claimants (and 
the Judges Who Evaluate Them), AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR LAW AND POL’Y ISSUE BRIEF, Mar. 
2012, at 1, 4.  
63. Id.  
64. Id.  
65. Vicki Lens, Judge or Bureaucrat? How Administrative Law Judges Exercise Discretion 
in Welfare Bureaucracies, 86 SOC. SERV. REV. 269, 271 (2012). 
66. Gerald Hayes, Social Security Disability and the Administrative Law Judge, 17 A.F. L. 
REV. 73, 76 (1975). 
67. Id.  
68. Id. 
69. Lens, supra note 65, at 269.  
70. Id. at 269-70. 
71. Id. at 270. 
72. Id.  
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bureaucratic actors who perform within a bureaucracy.73  Therefore, Lens 
tries to understand “how administrative law judges exercise the discretion 
granted them by their professional training and their role in the bureau-
cracy.”74 
Lens was not the first to focus on ALJs’ role in the awards process.  As 
early as 1975, Champagne and Danube sought to understand the 
inconsistencies among the reversal rates of ALJs by exploring “the 
relationship between administrative law judges’ characteristics and their 
decisions.”75  They sent out questionnaires to ALJs to determine whether 
background and attitudinal variables had a role in administrative judicial 
decision making.76  However, the background and attitude variables showed 
little correlation with the difference in reversal rates.77  Most significantly 
for this study, Champagne and Danube found that there was no correlation 
between caseload and reversal rates.78  However, they did note that 
“[p]erhaps the number of cases handled by an administrative law judge is 
still manageable and allows him time to consider seriously all of his 
decisions.”79 
Champagne and Danube argue that one “explanation of the smaller role 
of background and attitude is that administrative law judges are extremely 
well qualified.”80  “[T]he role of patronage politics and other political 
variables” is not as important in the selection of ALJs as it is for other 
judges;81 therefore, this factor, along with the qualifications of ALJs, results 
in a “more uniformly high degree of professionalism of administrative law 
judges[, which] may account for the low correlation of reversal rates with 
background and attitude variables.”82 They suggest that “[a]ny blatant bias 
measured by such variables as party or religious affiliation possibly can be 
overcome by the professionalism of administrative law judges.”83  
Currently, “federal ALJs must be lawyers for at least seven years, pass an 
examination, and then score competitively well after a series of interviews 




75. Anthony Champagne & Amos Danube, An Empirical Analysis of Decisions of 
Administrative Law Judges in the Social Security Disability Program, 64 GEO. L.J. 43, 45 (1975).  
76. Id. at 45-46. 
77. Id. at 50. 
78. Id.  
79. Id.  
80. Id. at 50. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 50-51.  
83. Id. at 51.  
84. Dubin & Rains, supra note 62, at 4.  
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Building on Champagne and Danube’s ideals of the professional judge, 
Vicki Lens’s recent work categorizes the judges, seeking “to understand 
how administrative law judges exercise the discretion granted them by their 
professional training and their role in the bureaucracy.”85  Lens claims that 
ALJs often follow one of two approaches.86  The “bureaucratic approach” is 
when judges “use their discretion to replicate the norms and expectations of 
bureaucratic decision making.”87  On the other hand, “judges may reinforce 
their designated role as adjudicators of disputes and may safeguard against 
arbitrary state actions” by using the “adjudicator approach.”88  Judges’ 
professional training allows them to scrutinize an agency’s practice and 
procedures.89  Bureaucratic approach judges “predominately choose to align 
themselves with the agency whose decisions they review.”90  In contrast, 
adjudicator approach judges “continually challenge and scrutinize the 
agency, emphasizing their neutrality and role as a judicial official.”91 
Of significant note, Lens explains that welfare bureaucracies routinely 
engage in excessive proceduralism, and as a consequence, cases that make 
it to a hearing “often reflect this emphasis on procedural compliance.”92 
This is an important factor to consider when comparing some states and 
regions, in light of locations’ varying application volumes.93  Judges may 
choose to ignore the procedural breaches and proceed to the merits of the 
case.94  However, in highly populated areas, or at offices where the 
workload is substantial, this excessive proceduralism affects the way in 
which judges are allowed to frame their issues and decide cases.95  Lens 
noted that suburban units have fewer defects and are more likely to proceed 
with the substantive issues because their caseload is much smaller.96  In 
contrast, urban units deal more frequently with procedural issues and rarely 
get to exercise professional skills and discretion.97  This means that 
“bureaucratic practices . . . shape the nature and quality of disputes” and the 
judges’ choice of discretion at hearings.98  Therefore, this suggests that 
 
85. Lens, supra note 65, at 270. 
86. Id. at 271. 
87. Id.  
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 278. 
90. Id.  
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 275-76. 
93. See id. at 276. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 277. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 277-78. 
         
364 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:353 
there is a significant relationship between ALJs’ discretionary choices and 
the discretionary actions of the street-level bureaucrats. 
Lens’s study also begins to examine two types of ALJs in relation to 
decision-making—by identifying two approaches to ALJ decision-
making—namely, “Bureaucratic” judges and “Adjudicators.”99  Lens 
explains how Bureaucratic judges and Adjudicators exercise role discretion 
when making decisions and how that discretion will affect applicants in the 
Social Security Administration.100  Bureaucratic judges will uphold the 
decisions of their frontline workers.101  Adjudicators will often reverse the 
decision, or in the very least, exercise individual autonomy and discretion to 
strive towards justice for the applicants.102  However, Lens does not focus 
on the reasons for which a judicial actor follows the adjudicative or 
bureaucratic approach.  There are adjudicators and bureaucratic ALJs 
within the SSA, but perhaps geography and subsequent political nature or 
individual political views play a role in judges’ strategic use of discretion. 
C. THE NEXT STEPS 
Benítez-Silva et al. concluded in their 1999 study that “the conditional 
probability of being awarded benefits is more than 50% higher at the appeal 
stage than at the initial application stage.”103  After this alarming 
conclusion, the researchers suggest that future work should concentrate on 
the cause of this variation.104  Many researches have tried to determine why 
variations exist among different states at the street-level.  For example, a 
recent study by Lens concentrates on the different approaches ALJs use to 
exercise varying discretion.105  A 1997 General Accounting Office Report 
suggested that “the higher award rate for appealed cases is a result of the 
combination of large backlogs and excessive leniency at the ALJ stage.”106 
Benítez-Silva et al. suggest a future study is needed to determine “whether 
the higher award rate for appealed cases is a result of this combination of 
large backlogs and excessive leniency” or if it “is a result of valid reversals 
due to excessive stringency and poor documentation of reasons for denials” 
at the street-level bureaucrat stage.107 
 
99. Id. at 287. 
100. Id. at 287-88. 
101. Id.  
102. Id. 
103. Benı́tez-Silva, supra note 13, at 170. 
104. Id. at 170-71. 
105. Lens, supra note 65, at 278. 
106. Benı́tez-Silva, supra note 13, at 170-71. 
107. Id. 
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Most significantly, Lens’s findings suggest that there is a relationship 
between the actions of the street-level bureaucrats and the discretion and 
subsequent decisions of the ALJs,108  yet no such study has considered this 
relationship.  The variations continue to exist both vertically and horiz-
ontally among actors and among states in the SSA.  Lack of conformity due 
to the use of discretion among street-level bureaucrats and ALJs continues 
to contribute to these variations. 
Keiser suggests that managers can reduce inconsistencies between units 
by sharing information and shaping perceptions of the preferences and 
actions of actors in other units.109  If this is true, understanding the 
relationship and the effects of street-level bureaucrats’ actions on ALJs 
could help reduce these inconsistencies.  Therefore, this study sets out to 
understand this relationship and hopefully begins to fill in the gaps of the 
existing research in order to reduce the inconsistencies within the SSA’s 
award process both vertically and horizontally. 
IV. METHODS & RESULTS 
In the year 2011, 3,041,500 applicants requested social security 
disability benefits.110  Of those 3,041,500 applicants, 1,031,023 (33%) were 
awarded benefits.111  Only 321,015 (10.6%) applicants received a dispo-
sition from an ALJ.112  However, once appealed to the ALJ stage, appli-
cants’ chances of receiving benefits increased to an average of 62.82%.113 
ALJs grant appeals at a rate ranging from 39.8% in Delaware to 80.9% in 
Hawaii.114  Overall, state award rates range from 26.1% in Connecticut to 
49.3% in Washington D.C.115  In order to better assess these discrepancies, 
the dependent variable in this study, the percent of awards ALJs are 
responsible for granting, was calculated for each available state and the 
District of Columbia.116 
This study is based upon the current research regarding discrepancies 
in the administration of awards by the SSA and the ongoing debate about 
 
108. See generally, Lens, supra note 65. 
109. Keiser, supra, note 11, at 253.  
110. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SSI ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, 2012, at 115, 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ssi_asr/2012/ssi_asr12.pdf.  
111. Id. at 125. 
112. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 2012, at 2.75, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ 
supplement/2012/supplement12.pdf. 
113. This data is a mathematical average of the percentages found in Table A1, infra. 
114. See infra Table A1. 
115. See infra Table A1. 
116. See infra Table A1.  
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whether DDS workers or ALJs are to blame for these discrepancies.  This 
study utilizes six independent variables to determine their effect on the 
percentage of awards ALJs are responsible for granting in each state. 
Concentrating on potential DDS worker influences, this study includes a 
dummy variable117 for whether the optional state supplement fund is 
administered wholly or in part by the state.  This study also includes 
dummy variables for democratic control of the governorship and 
democratic control of the state legislature.  The study also includes 
independent variables for both the DDS workers’ initial workload and the 
ALJs’ workload.  The model also includes an independent variable for the 
percent appeals granted by ALJs in order to assess the ALJs’ tendency to 
grant appeals as a factor in the percent of awards the ALJs are responsible 
for awarding. 
This study used ordinary least squares (“OLS”) multivariate 
regression118  to analyze the data compiled from the SSA and other state 
government websites.  The OLS regression revealed relationships between 
the states, their DDS workers, and ALJs.  Controlling for the six 
















117. A dummy variable (also known as a dichotomous or binary variable) is a variable which 
assumes two values, zero and 1, and is created to represent an attribute of a given observation.  A 
value of 1 is typically associated with the presence of the attribute of interest and a value of 0 is 
associated with its absence.  For example, if the state supplement fund is funded either wholly or 
in part by the state, this variable would assume a value of 1.  If it was not funded by the state, this 
variable would assume a value of 0.  
118. Ordinary Least Squares multivariate regression is a generalized linear modeling 
technique that may be used to model the impact of one or more variables on quantifiable outcomes 
of interest.  “Multivariate regression” indicates that multiple independent variables are present in 
the model.  OLS regressions are used to test the independent variables’ effect on the dependent 
variable. 
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Table 1. OLS Regression Results 
 Coefficient 
(β) 
Std. Error t-value p-value 
(sig.) 




-4.214 1.140 -3.697 .001 
ALJ Workload 
per 10,000 




-9.561 7.308 -1.308 .199 
Democratic 
Governor 








.074 .447 0.166 .869 
n= 45 R2 = .324 Adj. R2 = 
.217 
F = 3.036 
(d.f. = 6, 
38) 
Sig (F) = 
0.016 
 
The overall results of the OLS regression were statistically 
significant.119  Given the observed F score, the model suggests that the joint 
explanatory power of the independent variables included in the model are 
statistically significant.  However, only two of the individual independent 
variables have a relationship with the dependent variable.  There is a 
significant relationship between the percentage of awards the ALJs are 
responsible for granting and the DDS worker’s initial workload.  There is 
also a significant relationship between the percentage of awards the ALJs 
are responsible for granting and the ALJs’ workload. 
 
119. “Statistical significance” refers to a result that is not attributed to chance.  Here, it 
means that the percentage of awards the ALJs are responsible for granting is attributable to the 
effect of the independent variables included in the model and is extremely unlikely to result from 
chance. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
The debate continues: Who is responsible for the discrepancies 
between SSA reward levels and among state’s award rates?  This study 
used a model, which was developed to analyze the amount of awards that 
the ALJs were responsible for awarding against the independent factors that 
may affect the discretion of SSA agents.  If the number of ALJ awards was 
relatively high, it would indicate that there was a flaw at the beginning of 
the award process that required correction.  However, after looking at the 
available states, it is evident that the percentage of awards that ALJs are 
responsible for granting continues to differ among states.  Since, the process 
for determining awards at the initial determination and reconsideration 
stages uses the same process and is uniform nationwide, the differing rates 
of appeals awards does not suggest just one flaw in the system. 
This study included independent variables utilized to focus on the DDS 
workers’ involvement at the initial stages.  The purpose of utilizing such 
variables is to determine if something during the initial determination stage 
affects the initial determination or if something biases the DDS workers 
which would later cause a high reversal rate by the ALJs.  For example, the 
independent variable of state funding, which is the administration of 
optional state funds both wholly or in part by the state, could potentially 
influence DDS workers awarding benefits based upon a budget.  As Keiser 
suggested, DDS workers could be responsive to “fiscal incentives that exist 
for state governments to manipulate access to the programs.”120  Keiser 
found “that when state governments have a financial interest in whether 
applicants are given access to a program, street-level state bureaucrats take 
these interests into account in their decision making.”121  The model 
indicates that there is no relationship between states controlling their own 
funding and the likelihood that ALJs are responsible for awarding more 
benefits.  However, it is important to note that some states administer their 
own optional funding either wholly or in part, but some states do not have 
an optional funding program, and in some cases, the federal government 
administers the state’s optional funding.  This would indicate that a state’s 
financial incentives do not necessarily influence DDS workers to deny 
awards that would later be awarded by the ALJs. 
However, this area should be explored further.  This model only takes 
into account whether or not the state has some influence in administering 
state funds.  It does not itself consider the amount of funds each state 
contributes, the amount of control the states have in distributing the funds, 
 
120. Keiser, supra note 27, at 158. 
121. Id. 
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or whether or not the states share distribution control with the federal 
government; this data was not specifically available from the SSA 
compilation files.  However, if this data were analyzed, it may reveal a 
relationship between DDS worker discretion and the amount of awards the 
DDS workers are responsible for granting as Keiser initially suggested.122 
Furthermore, this model lacked the data to determine how many awards 
each individual state distributes at the initial determination stage by state. 
This data would have been more useful in comparing DDS worker 
discretion and ALJ discretion. 
Next, the model considered the workload of DDS workers and the 
percent of awards the ALJs were responsible for granting.  The model 
indicates that there is a negative relationship between the DDS workload 
and the percentage of awards granted by ALJs.  As the number of initial 
applications increases by 10,000, the percentage of awards the ALJs are 
responsible for granting decreases by 4.214 percent, all else held constant. 
According to Keiser’s 2001 study findings, caseload demand affects the 
award rate because “high demand reduces acceptance rates due to resource 
shortages.”123  In contrast, this model suggests high caseload demands at the 
initial determination level decrease the overall percent of awards that the 
ALJs are responsible for awarding.  This may suggest that the initial 
workload of DDS workers causes the workers to award benefits at a higher 
rate and err on the side of awarding benefits instead of later being 
overturned by ALJs. 
In contrast, the model also suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between the ALJs’ workload and the percent of award the ALJs are 
responsible for granting.  As the number of appeals to ALJs increase by 
10,000, the percentage of awards ALJs are responsible for awarding 
increases by 33.882 percent, all else held constant.  This seems counter-
intuitive, but it also appears that ALJs err on the side of granting appeals if 
they are overworked.  Champagne and Danube found that there was no 
correlation between caseload and reversal rates.124  However, they did note 
that “perhaps the number of cases handled by an administrative law judge is 
still manageable and allows him time to consider seriously all of his 
decisions.”125  Now, after twenty years have passed, it appears that the high 
level of workload demand does affect ALJ award rates. 
 
122. Id. at 144. 
123. Id. at 157. 
124. Champagne & Danube, supra note 75, at 50. 
125. Id.  
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Therefore, it appears that as the workload of an individual increases, 
whether the individual is a street-level bureaucrat or an ALJ, the likelihood 
that one will error on the side of awarding benefits also increases.  Overall, 
the study indicates that workload may be an indication of a flaw in the 
overall SSA benefit system that would account for the discrepancies 
horizontally and vertically within the system. 
As suggested by Lens, it appears that in SSA offices with substantial 
workloads, excessive proceduralism affects how judges frame the issues 
and decide cases.126  For example, lightly populated areas with smaller 
workloads have fewer defects and are more likely to proceed to ALJ 
hearings with the substantive issues.127  In contrast, highly populated areas 
with an increased workload deal more frequently with procedural issues and 
rarely get to exercise professional skills and discretion.128  Therefore, this 
study indicates that there is a significant relationship between ALJs’ 
discretionary choices and the discretionary actions of the street-level 
bureaucrats as Lens already suggested.  This demonstrates that bureaucratic 
practices shape the nature and quality of disputes and the judges’ use of 
discretion at hearings.129  Still, workload as a factor creating inconsistencies 
in the bureaucracies deserves further study, perhaps with a model that 
concentrates not only on workload but also the amount of DDS workers and 
ALJs handling the workload. 
The model also considers political control of the states.  The model 
focuses, using dummy variables, on both the governor’s political affiliation 
and the state legislative control.  The idea behind this variable was to view 
whether political control of either position of government persuaded DDS 
workers to award more or less benefits to individuals due to influence by 
Democrats.  However, after running the regression, the results indicate that 
political control does not have a relationship with the percent of awards that 
ALJs are responsible for granting.  Therefore, political control by the 
governor and the state legislature does not appear to create bias or control 
the DDS worker to either grant or deny applicants.  As research suggests, 
political control may not influence worker discretion because both parties 
find advantages in awarding disability benefits to individuals in need.130 
Lastly, the model considered the ALJs’ appeals award rate on its own 
merits in order to control for ALJs who simply award appeals at a high rate, 
absent any influence or relationship with the initial determination stages. 
 
126. See Lens, supra note 65, at 276. 
127. Id. at 277. 
128. Id.  
129. See id. at 277-78. 
130. Keiser, supra note 27, at 157. 
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The results indicate that there is no relationship between the ALJ appeals 
grant rate and the percentage of awards the ALJs were responsible for 
granting by state.  Although this may indicate that the ALJs’ award rate is 
not a factor in determining the reversal of initial determinations, it may shed 
some light on who is to blame for the discrepancies.  The model suggests 
there is no relationship between appeals granted and the overall grant of 
awards by ALJ when considered with the states’ overall award rates.  This 
suggests that ALJs are not responsible for the high reversal rates and the 
discrepancies among reversal rates by state. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Variations continue to exist both vertically and horizontally among 
actors and among states in the SSA.  Lack of conformity due to the use of 
discretion among street-level bureaucrats and ALJs continues to contribute 
to these variations.  Understanding the relationship and the effects of street-
level bureaucrats’ actions on ALJs and vice versa may help reduce these 
inconsistencies.  Therefore, this study set out to understand these relation-
ships and begins to fill in the gaps of the existing research in order to reduce 
the inconsistencies within the SSA’s award process both vertically and 
horizontally. 
These discrepancies, especially the large amount of denials at the initial 
determination stages, are not how the system should work.  In order to 
begin to see if these discrepancies are a strategy by the SSA to award less 
benefits or to see if something in the administrative process is broken, this 
study concentrated on specific factors.  These factors included a state’s 
political control, workload demands, and a state’s financial contributions to 
benefits programs and their effect on the percent of awards ALJs are 
responsible for granting. 
After running an OLS regression, the study found that overall these 
factors have an effect on the percent of awards ALJs are responsible for 
granting.  More specifically, the study found that the initial workload of 
street-level bureaucrats has a negative relationship with the percent of 
awards ALJs are responsible for granting.  Furthermore, the study found 
that the workload of ALJs has a positive relationship with the percent of 
awards ALJs are responsible for granting.  It appears that as the workload 
of an individual increases, whether the individual is a street-level bureaucrat 
or an administrative law judge, the likelihood that one will err on the side of 
awarding benefits also increases.  Overall, the study indicates that workload 
may be an indication of a flaw in the overall SSA benefit system that would 
account for the discrepancies horizontally and vertically within the system. 
The study also eliminates factors such as political control, state contribution 
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funds, and ALJs’ tendencies to award appeals at higher rates as factors that 
influence or bias the system significantly. 
This study is important for the SSA to consider in order to improve its 
implementation of policy and functions of the administrative process.  
These results are also important for actors within the SSA, so that they can 
understand the relationships and the effects of those relationships with other 
actors within the agencies.  It can also shed light on why and how the SSA 
makes decisions in order for attorneys and applicants to better make claims 
and advocate for benefits.  If these discrepancies are further explored, the 
reason for the discrepancies can be pinpointed in order to correct any flaws 
in the system.  Once the system is fixed, it will not only save applicants’ 
benefits, time, inconvenience, and money, but it will also save the SSA 
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Appendix 
Table A1: State Data Table 
State 
Overall Benefits Awarded 
(%) 





Alabama 36.1 66 6 63.3 
Alaska 40.2 54 24.5 
Arizona 29 8 60.2 36.4 
Arkansas 32 5 59.4 34 
California 36.1 62.7 28.3 
Colorado 35.7 59 3 38.4 
Connecticut 26.1 67 6 51.7 
Delaware 26.4 39 8 34.4 
D.C. 49 3 74.2 52.5 
Florida 33.9 62.7 29.3 
Georgia 31 6 68 3 41.3 
Hawaii 38 3 80.9 15.2 
Idaho 33 3     
Illinois 29.4 57.2 52.9 
Indiana 31.9 56.7 38.8 
Iowa 30 5 60 18.6 
Kansas 36 3 52.1 34.8 
Kentucky 31.7 62 6 46 
Louisiana 32 6 51.1 27.7 
Maine 29.2 76 3 47.7 
Maryland 30.4 66 42.1 
Massachusetts 34 3 66.2 26 
Michigan 36 5 61 3 41.8 
Minnesota 35 6 58.9 28.5 
Mississippi 28 5 52.9 41.8 
Missouri 31 5 58.9 60.3 
Montana 34.9 59 5 64.1 
Nebraska 32.4 69.9 32.7 
Nevada 33.2 62.9 16.9 
New Hampshire 41 3 71.2 70 
New Jersey 40 3 73.9 25.4 
New Mexico 34 70.7 75.6 
New York 38.4 68 8 38.3 
North Carolina 30.4 65.1 37.2 
North Dakota 28 3 62 6 146.2 
Ohio 32.2 60.9 30.2 
Oklahoma 29 8 58 8 54.8 
Oregon 34.4 59 6 35.9 
Pennsylvania 33 8 60 6 43 
Rhode Island 33 5 60.9 43.8 
South Carolina 30 5 66 6 53.5 
South Dakota 30.2     
Tennessee 36 3 71 6 67.5 
Texas 34.7 53.7 21.4 
Utah 38.4 72.1 43.7 
Vermont 33.7     
Virginia 34 8 56.9 67 
Washington 40 5 69.1 34 
West Virginia 32 70.9 96.6 
Wisconsin 31 8 50.7 20.7 
Wyoming 34     
 
